1. Contemporary Detroit: a metropolis of contradictions

If an ordinary American hears the word”Detroit”, several images might come to his mind: the once glamorous Motor City that was synonymous for the whole American car industry and even for the whole manufacturing sector in the USA; he might remember the past as the 'good old time', where the primary product of Detroit, the automobile, made nearly every American family a proud car-owning one, advancing them to the “American Dream”. But nowadays, many Americans might prejudge Detroit as a poor city, which is devastated by blacks, who are violent, criminal, taking drugs and driving the business out of the city. Is this a typical case of blaming the victim?

For many middle-class whites in the U.S., Detroit resembles what is going wrong in America, stated in the saying “as Detroit goes, so goes the country”, but how much of this viewpoint is right and what were the reasons for the obvious transformation?

To make it clear right at the beginning: metropolitan Detroit is not a poor place in general: the mostly white inhabitants of the suburbs enjoy a high wage income and very good living conditions. However, the City of Detroit, the core of the metropolitan area, suffers from poorness and unemployment. In the year 2000, 81,6%¹ of the dwellers in the city were African Americans, suffering increased isolation and unemployment, whereas Blacks just made up 5% of the population in the suburbs. Moreover, the poverty rate for the city was at 32%, the one for the ring was just 6%.² These figures underline the racial polarisation and inequality and show up the contradiction between the metropolitan area and the City of Detroit.

As Detroit celebrated its 300^th birthday in 2001, it might be reasonable, to have a look at Detroit's past, present and future.

In this essay, I try to reveal the multi-causality of the decline of the 'Motor-City' of the USA, covering different aspects ranging from historical, economical, racial and structural regard. Finally, a conclusion is made, reviewing the past and contemporary Detroit, but also giving an outlook on the future of the urban area.

2. An ailing patient — the decline of Detroit, “Motor City” of the USA

2.1. The economic transformation of Detroit

2.1.1. A brief view on Detroit’s history from 1701-1948

2.1.1.1. A French enclave as the beginning

Detroit was officially founded on July 24, 1701, when Antoine de la Mothe Cadillac landed with a fleet of 25 large canoes at a riverside. The site was appropriate because of its strategic location on the Great Lakes. The city's name comes from the French word “étroit”, which means the “strait”. In this case, “L'étroit” is the river that connects Lake Erie with Lake Huron. The French founded the village as a military stronghold to control fur trade on the lakes, and ever since, the strait has been the geographic spine of the city. For a long time the Detroit River was the city's economic backbone, too. The early ribbon farmer cultivated long, narrow strips of land, each jutting out from the river to give them access to water and transportation.¹ The people from France were establishing a fort named Pontchartrain, to control the fur trade in the region and to keep the British, who were also interested in the wealth of the new land, out of their district. But the Frenchmen had to endure hardships for 59 years: living conditions were poor and they were constantly attacked by some Indian tribes, though they were allied with others. However, in 1760, Detroit was given to the British as part of the agreement of the French and Indian war. The 600 people living in the town consisted of Indians, French and British. During the 'Revolutionary War' between the Americans and the British, Detroit was a base for Indian war parties; together with the British, they attacked nearby American cities like Kentucky, Pennsylvania and New York. But in 1783, the war was closed by the Treaty of Paris, and Detroit was officially awarded to the United States in the same year. In 1805, the State of Michigan was created out of Indiana territory with Detroit as its seat of government. The city was growing slowly but steadily, by 1820, Detroit's population was 1422, already including 6% free blacks.² Until the 19^th century, the most important branches of work were ship-building, wood processing and metal-, tabacco- and food-production, but this should change during the next centuries.

2.1.1.2. 19^th century and Detroit’s role as a city of manufacture

In the first 100 years of its existence, Detroit was quite a normal city, however it had several advantages because of its good connection to waterfronts of the lakes and the St. Clair river. So, the city had an easy access to the Northeast of the USA, laying between the iron-resources in North-Michigan and the coal resources of the mid-Atlantic states. Therefore, steel production was suggesting, blast furnaces and brass foundries emerged. The city's factories produced stoves, gasoline engines, marine equipment and carriages³, all forerunners of the car industry, especially the latter. Early automobiles were modelled out of railroad cars, where the carriage making provided bodies, wheels and the assembly principle. The city became the capital of manufacture in that area, and was attracting all kinds of workers, also blacks from the South. They were freed from slavery and searched unskilled but relatively high-paid work. Likewise, Detroit's overall population passed 53400 people in 1864.⁴

This all made up several factors of production: (1) the easy access to raw materials like wood, iron and coal, (2) the wealth of businessmen, who were willing to invest their money in new manufactures, (3) a good connection because of the rail- and lake-transportation system, (4) a history of a capital of metal bending with (5) numerous skilled machinists, (6) little unionisation in the early 1900^th century (this did not last long) and (7) the serendipity of Michigan residents, to realise valuable discoveries and trying to market them.

2.1.1.3. Beginning of the new era of automobile production

The last point of the last chapter may have been very important for Detroit: the ambitious son of a farmer, Henry Ford, built his first car in Detroit in 1896. Nothing spectacular, since the automobile had already been around for a while. But it was the method of how to build cars that would soon revolutionise the whole industry: the moving assembly line. Every workers had just to put small parts together in an easy working progress; thereforee production increased dramatically. The coachwork, the backbone of a car, could now be built in 90 minutes than in 14 hours before the invention of the conveyor belt. As no more expensive workers were needed, because production was split into several steps, cheap and recently immigrated workers could be deployed. This reduced the cost of Ford's famous Model T from $850 in 1908 to $290 in 1920.⁵ Consequently, the sales figures exploded and lots of car companies emerged, like Oldsmobile, founded by Ransom Olds in 1899.

The demand of the World War I also meant an increased output of trucks.

By 1920, Michigan was the centre of the auto industry, with several steel mills, foundries and engine plants. New supplier firms for rubber products, auto bodies, engines, fans and so on went to Michigan to satisfy the rising demand. First mass-production facilities were established like the Highland Park plant and the River Rouge factory of Ford. (PIC6,16)⁶. Meanwhile, the city's population increased dramatically and the need for living space could hardly be satisfied.

Because of the despotic working conditions especially in the plants of the Ford Motor Company, unions were fighting for their acclaim since the 1930s. As the “Great Depression” arrived, President Roosevelt recognised this development in his first year of presidency, in 1933, and created the charta of the “New Deal”. It assured the workers the most important care, but also developed a plan to counter the effect of the recent industrial decline. In addition, the Congress also passed the “National Recovery Act” in 1933, which gave workers “the right for the vote for representatives”. But the patriarchal way of management at Ford kept the unions down until 1941⁷.

Detroit was the nation's fastest-growing large city, but the employment structure distinguished itself from other American metropolises, because it depended primarily on vehicle production and other manufacturing industries, and never became a dominant centre of trade, financial services, entertainment or government.

2.1.1.4. The ‘Arsenal of Democracy’ during WWII

However, this was not yet important, because another tremendous push for Detroit began with World War II: Detroit produced a lot of military equipment that could be picked up by the allied by paying for it. This helped to overcome the “Great Depression” and pushed the gross domestic product of the USA to pre-depression years and even surpassed it. The vacant capacities in the automobile industry were used for the building of war machinery, resulting in 100% workload. Detroit – now also called “Arsenal of Democracy” after a catchphrase of Roosevelt – got in a very short period of time one of the most dense and most productive industrial “boom town” in the world. In 1944, a terrible year in general, the U.S. succeeded in near full employment and all kind of ethnicities and races worked together in Detroit's industry. Even Stalin was impressed by the output of Detroit. In 1947, he should have been saying on the Teheranian Conference that Germany had been “defeated by Detroit”, as it produced, among others, engines for the tanks of the red army.⁸

2.1.2. Economical rise of post-war Detroit

The post-war history of the US automobile industry and consequently the post-war history of Detroit can be divided into two periods in general: before and after the 1970s. We will now have a look on the prosperity that has followed the World War II until its highest peak during the 1970s.

2.1.2.1. Boom of the automobile industry

During the 1950s, the domestic market of the USA was booming again after the “Great Depression”, especially the car industry. The overall U.S. economy grew at an average annual rate of 4% between 1950 and 1970. Low interest rates⁹ in the first two decades after the war stimulated credit buying and significantly expanded the ownership of durable goods like automobiles. Equally important is the rising number of independent households from 43,5 million in 1950 to 63,5 million in 1970.¹⁰ The families wanted to live the American Dream: owning a house (see 3.1.2) and, due to the new mobility in social and fiscal concerns, they needed a car. The figure that 75% of all commuting trips to work were made by car in 1970, show the dependence on the automobile and the interstate highway system. As Detroit was also dominating the global market, it is not surprising that in 1950, the US auto industry produced 76% of all the passenger cars in the world.¹¹ Foreign cars were not competitive at that time, because they did not provided the amount of comfort like the American cars. Fuel-consumption was not relevant because of the low gasoline-price.¹² Slowly, the Big Three emerged. This is nickname for three giants in the car industry, Chrysler (and subdivisions like Dodge, Plymouth, Jeep), Ford (and subdivisions like Lincoln) and General Motors (and subdivisions like Oldsmobile, Chevrolet, Buick and Cadillac); they are all located in Detroit and established an oligopoly¹³ that was never seen before. To quote Carlson from his book, the Big Three “had the license to print money”¹⁴. GM for example earned a record of $3,5 billion in 1978 and hit a sale record of $66,3 billion in 1979. As a result of this economical rise, a million people worked in automobile plants at a relatively high wage¹⁵, and manufacturing job created in Detroit generated five more¹⁶, at auto parts suppliers all over the country(pic11,15). Due to this fact, the unions were most powerful at that time, because they formed a very self-confident proletariat. Thus, the union UAW (United Automobile Workers, already created in 1935) had the greatest influence in its history.

2.1.2.2. Severe problems faded out and deferred

Despite the impressive uprise of the economy in Detroit and in the USA, problems evolved, but were not fully recognised or even eliminated. One problem was that new car models were just redesigned each year, but not technically revised¹⁷. This kept the cost for the production very low, but the risk of getting outdated is very high. Another crucial component was the very low gasoline price with no taxation on it: this led to cars that need a lot of gasoline; of course, this did not matter when times were prosperous, like the 1960s. As a result, the Big Three leaned back and did not care about the needs of customers nor about the competitors coming from Europe or Asia. During the two oil crisis in 1973/74¹⁸ and 1979/80, a lot of panic and anxieties arose because it revealed the dependance of the USA to oil; in 1971, the U.S. auto industry achieved the highest sales in its history, but right after 1973, the small car market share rose from 40% in 1973 to 52% in 1975¹⁹, a segment, the Big Three did not enter properly. As the oil price relaxed again, the American car industry did not react in changing their product line, but remained producing big and gasoline-wasting cars.

2.1.3. The 1980’s: problems intensified

In the next passage we will have a look at the situation during the 1980s, where problems intensified, as the auto industry's decline was a symptom of the decline of the manufacturing sector in the US and most other western economies; the sector has been replaced by the service sector or high-technology industry. In the 1980s, 250000 manufacturing workers of the car giants lost their jobs, respectively 450000 lost their jobs in the supplier industries

2.1.3.1. United States in a globalised world

Since our single nations are connected by a globalised market for products, it offers every single nation tremendous advantages but also disadvantages. So called boom-and-bust cycles describe the constant up and down in the economy, and exist in any open market²⁰. They overlap with each other since the nation build an interwoven network. The United States is no longer an isolated economy as it was back in the 1950s. The effects of this system cannot be removed, maximally reduced by for example restrictive import measures. But this often just worsens the problems as other nations will put up similar restrictions, too, which leads to a loss of jobs in the export sectors. In former times, Detroit's answer to the boom-and-bust cycles was to shut down its plants and laying off work for months. However, as unions made labour contracts at GM, Ford and Chrysler, companies require to pay their workers nearly at their full wage, no matter if they are working or not.²¹

Also, the US industrial labour force lost its monopoly in the world market to the fast-growing, skilled and cheap labour of the developing countries. Several U.S. auto firms therefore had to move jobs from the domestic country to nations with lower wages or to automate production at home, to remain competitive.

Furthermore, since the oil price shock, more American customers wanted reasonable cars with low gasoline consumption that the Big Three could not offer; due to this, the US market was a primary target for automobile producers all over the world.²²

2.1.3.2. The effects of a saturated U.S.-market

The production of cars peaked in 1978 (see pic 19,23!!), but collapsed right after that time. One factor, next to the arriving imports from other nations was the saturated domestic market of the U.S. Because new cars offered barely new technical innovations. Sales were no more rising in the 1980s, while interest rates were up to 16% for new car financing. As the situation did not change, US firms had to close plants, lay off jobs, reduce wages and so on, in order to reduce costs.²³ Additionally, the profit margins²⁴ also increased: in 1973, before the first oil crisis, profit margins were around 11,4% but in 1983, as more imports had arrived, profit margins were just around 7,3%²⁵; this led to an decreased ability and enthusiasm of the car-sellers to trade new cars.

2.1.3.3. The clever competitors: Imports from Asia and Europe and their success

As already mentioned, import companies from Europe and Asia were concentrating on the US market for an outlet of their cars. Especially the cars from Japan, who were the first to arrive in the US, had several advantages to the American cars. Firstly, they were not needing so much gasoline, resulting in better fuel-efficiency and better ecology. This was an important issue, as more and more Americans preferred those cars since the oil crisis, correspondingly with the limitation of exhaust fumes in California. As gasoline was expensive in western Europe and Japan because of the higher taxation, and as it was cheap in America, domestic cars were non-competitive with the ones from abroad. Secondly, they had better quality, resulting in a good reputation. Thirdly, they were cheaper but had more worth of price, therefore were more stable in the resale value. This success of foreign companies was due to a more efficient management, more demanding quality checks and taking the needs of the customers more seriously.

The price difference of a comparable Japanese and American car was about $1500 in the 1980s, where just 25% could be justified by different labour costs, the remaining 75% were management factors like inadequate quality control, low labour productivity and inefficient management of parts, supplies and inventory in the USA; the “just-in-time” inventory management by the Japanese reduced costs and was more flexible than the US part suppliers that were spread all over the country²⁶. Furthermore, the workers in Asia have a completely different relationship to their employer, as everyone, from hourly worker to executives, is participating actively and with enthusiasm in the production process. As a result, it is allowed (and even welcome) to make suggestions that might increase productivity.²⁷

In addition to that, the Japanese motor vehicle production was growing 10% per year. To maintain such a growth they had do capture increasing shares of international markets, because their own domestic market was soon saturated, too. The easiest and most profitable target was the United States, where the American car companies could not satisfy the need for reasonable cars.²⁸

This challenged Detroit's automobile industry like never before. Unfortunately they reacted by just reducing wage costs through labour-saving processes and machinery, but also by outsourcing parts of the production to smaller and often not unionised firms. In 1981, the Reagan administration - more or less forced by the Big Three - put up a restriction on the total number of imported Japanese cars. However, the clever corporations from abroad reacted by building factories in the Mid-West of USA, not in the area of Detroit because of its lesser degree of unionisation²⁹. Therefore, the Japanese were no more importing cars, but building them right in the USA, at cheaper costs than the American companies, and could easily achive more parts of the market share in the USA.

And while the US automakers faced a crisis situation, even Asian and European luxury brands like Lexus, Mercedes-Benz and BMW were gaining impressive gains in their share of the US market, during a time, where the total market was shrinking³⁰. BMW, as a prime example, sold in 1974 just about 184000 cars world-wide, and thanks to the 3-series that is beloved by the American consumers, the company hit 320000 sales in 1980.³¹

Nowadays, import companies from Japan like Toyota, Honda, Mazda, Mitsubishi and Nissan all sell more vehicles in the US than they do in Japan. So success in the United States has become the priority. The combination of humility, determination, careful attention and, above all, devotion to quality has been a formula that has worked time and again for them.³²

2.1.3.4. The lethargy of the clumsy American car industry

It might be more than justified, to call the American car industry as acting clumsy; they seldomly sought for competing with imports by looking for improvements in their own company. Instead, they blamed the rivals as being unfair because the foreign governments should have helped the imports by keeping the currency rates abnormally low and enforced themselves a restriction of numbers of imported cars (see 1.3.3). Former GM vice-chairman Bob Lutz even accused the buyers of foreign cars for having a bad taste³³; not a good way to regain market shares. The Big Three too often believed that if the gasoline price would relax, customers would come back to the American car manufacturers. In sum, the Big Three were too lazy, too inflexible, underestimated the chances of the imports and the management was not sure what to do next. In the case of Chrysler, a company was also too weak to react; it was almost bankrupt twice in one decade: the first time in 1979, as they suffered from billion-dollar losses and the second oil crisis, the second time in 1989. Fortunately, the well-known and wise Lee Iococca was president and chairman of Chrysler during that time, resurrecting the company. But also GM lost $762,5 million in the year 1980 (its second loss in 72 years), just right after it hit a sales record in 1979³⁴.

Obviously, the car makers had an extreme difficulty to undertake a transformation to smaller and more fuel-efficient cars cars; given the “laissez-faire” tendency of the US government regarding economical and social policies, it was (and still is) of course unlikely that the administration would have imposed strict requirements for example for environmental issues that would have been reasonable, as the big companies would have been obliged to solve their deficit compulsory.³⁵ The Big Three did not react, when the total market was declining, above all because of the decreased numbers of big cars and trucks; but at the same time, the small car market was continuing to extend. This development already appeared during the mid-1960s, long before the oil crisis. Unfortunately, the small vehicles built in Detroit were poorly engineered and assembled; this gave the import companies an even greater chance to settle down in the American car market. Due to this evolution, the US car companies turned once again to the big cars and trucks, also because they had greater profit margins, clearly abandoning the small car market.³⁶ American executives had the opinion that compact cars might just be desired by ecology-minded individuals or families, but when consumers would want more space or comfort, they would automatically turn back to American automobiles. But as foreign companies, especially the ones from Asia, established a foothold in the USA, they themselves upgraded the product line with bigger cars, in order to gain an even greater market share.

2.1.4. The downfall and prospects of the Automobile industry in Detroit

The previous and the following chapters are closely connected, as the downfall of the Detroit's car companies continues until today. At the end of this section, I will finally try to outline the outlook of the car industry in Detroit.

2.1.4.1. The Big Three losing grip

As already stated, the share of American cars produced and sold in the US market declined ever since it reached its highest peak in the late 1970s (pic??19,106);

There are several factors that sustain such a transformation of an industry. Firstly because of the general change in economy (from manufacturing industry to service industry³⁷), many jobs are lost in automobile production, parts supply and sales; of course, primarily the former affects the economy in Detroit. Another problem is also that fact that, as the US automobile manufacturing industry will most probably never regain its once so great share of the US domestic market, it is very unlikely for the Big Three to have a chance to expand in other markets in the world. This also emerges severe social problems. Even if the automobile economy will revive, many jobs will be lost forever, because automation became reality in the plants and the export of work to foreign countries with lower wage rates actively promotes the trend of the international division of labour. The unions like the UAW already made wage and benefit concessions for limiting the outsourcing of production but this helps little. And as the workers diminish, so does the influence of unions in general (PICworkersEMPLOYED).

Another evidence for Detroit's self-inflicted harm was the vision of GM, Ford and Chrysler in the early 1990s that consumers will focus on new kinds of cars like pickups, minivans and in the mid-1990s on SUVs (Sports Utility Vehicles). This was partly true³⁸, but at the same time, the companies ignored almost the whole ordinary car market. As Detroit lost its grip on the small-car market in the 1980s to Asian car manufacturers, it did so too in the 1990s with the mid-sized car market. For example, Toyota's Camry and Accord and Volkswagen's Passat conquered a great market share³⁹. This again was the case in the highly profitable market of luxury cars: Cadillac and Lincoln have led this segment until 1986⁴⁰, but during the past 16 years, Lexus, Audi, BMW and Mercedes-Benz, just to name a few, overtook the American corporations in sales. (pic)

In order to create short-term profits, the Big Three did not invest sufficient capital in updating their product line. Firms such as Chrysler, GM and Ford simply grew too big to respond for the need of innovation. Cars of the competitors were driven by much more technology, as the car makers from Detroit just updated their products superficially. On the other hand, they have to meet harsh requirements to survive anyway on the market: offer a product line with lots of different car types and different price ranges, to respond to every single customers. In order to maintain the system of mass productions, they were set under the pressure to sell a high number of cars. This demanded a lot of strength, smaller companies were forced to quit business or merge with bigger companies. Even the Big Three were sometimes not strong enough, as we saw an almost bankrupt Chrysler (see 2.1.3.4.).

As a result, competitors - that now even build their cars in America, but not in the closer area of Detroit - caught up. In 2003, four out of 10 vehicles sold in the USA have been built by foreign companies⁴¹. BMW, Honda, Toyota or Mercedes-Benz and others devoted their human, financial, engineering and marketing abilities to the US market and were rewarded. American car makers did not focus on these branches, but were interested in short-term gainings. The primary aim of the Big Three was rarely to be good, but to be big and to grow strategically. Ford bought Jaguar in 1990 and Volvo in 1999 (for $6.45 billion) with a disappointing outcome. GM bought Saab and engaged in joint ventures with for example Fiat and Toyota but did not profit as much as it expected. Finally, Chrysler merged in 1998 with Daimler-Benz AG both corporations became DaimlerChrysler; but in the next years made it quite clear that it was rather a takeover of Chrysler than a merger⁴². The Germans were hoping that they have gained a cash machine that provides an easy and solid access to the American market. The resulting company, however, suffered from contradictions in the product line and from production delays. But without this unintended takeover, Chrysler might have been again bankrupt, as it was in deep financial trouble.

A further point is alarming: there is a strong tendency of people living in wealthier states of the United States, like California, to buy foreign cars. And as a role model, other people from other parts of the country might desire the cars of wealthier persons, too.⁴³

Another important issue is the problem of low resale values of automobiles made in Detroit; foreign cars have in general a better reputation, and thereforee are worth more money when they are traded. Aside from that, the Big Three inflicted damage on themselves, as they sold inexpensive mainstream car models like the Ford Taurus in great quantity and to a fair price to car-rental companies, which employed these cars in masses in their fleet. Normally, this would have been desirable, but as the rental-firms sold the slightly used cars back to private customers, the value of the same used car model dramatically shrunk in equal measure. This leads to the fact that many people want to buy cheap second-hand cars that are hardly used, instead of new cars that cost more money but offer little more. This leads again to a feeling of disappointment or even betrayal of many new car owners, as they have bought an auto at full price but can get just a fraction of it, when they trade it. Those people will think twice about buying again an American made car in the future.⁴⁴

2.1.4.2. Outlook on the future of Detroit’s car industry

In the end of the review about Detroit's economic transformation, we will have a look at the future of the car industry in Detroit and in America.

Already today, one cannot talk of the Big Three of Detroit anymore, because of the “merger” of Chrysler with Daimler resulting in the DaimlerChrylser corporation, now employing 466938 workers in over 200 countries. Chrysler will never again support any limitations against foreign-based companies like Mercedes-Benz, as they now are actually owned by one.

So the “Big Two” remain. Ford is indeed a big company with nowadays employing 340000 people in 30 countries, but is on the edge of an crisis. In former times, workers had received insurance pensions from the company. As more and more workers are about to retire, Ford has the obligation to fulfill contracts and paying the retirees: the pension fund has a deficit of $25.6 billion; health care liability are about $27.4 billion, also likely to bring enormous trouble to Ford.⁴⁵ Also remarkable is that the Ford family existing today owns about 30% of all shares of the company, sometimes resulting in absurd decisions as they are the major shareholder of the company, giving them a lot of power⁴⁶.

The second car giant left, GM, employes 388000 people world-wide, has plants in 50 nations and corporate presences in more than 200 countries⁴⁷. The company also has to cope with great financial losses, as they have to an $50 billion health care liability and the pensions are underfunded with about $25.6 billion.

This numbers reflect unhealthy corporations, but imports show an enormous financial strength. Taking Toyota for example, earned an operating profit of nearly $12 billion in 2002, more than the combined profits of the Detroit car companies during the past five years⁴⁸. Fighting against such a stunning superiority is already now next to impossible, as Toyota is forsooth not the only competitor.

In general there are three major cases, how the situation might develop for the car companies from Detroit. In the first case, they will simply lose market shares until 2010, with a rate they are used to the past few years, to around 50%⁴⁹. The second situation could be that at least one of the Big Three companies is likely to disappear, as “neither the size of GM, nor the Ford family at Ford nor the protection of DaimlerChrylser at Chrysler”⁵⁰ can protect from continued decline. The last of the three most probable occasions might be a further merger of an American car company with a foreign one, as it was the case with Chrysler, or even a coalition of GM and Ford.

Surprisingly, the Big Three have found an new ally in form of the unions. The latter are also interested in secure jobs and a flourishing American car industry. It is worth mentioning however that the actions of the United Auto Workers (UAW) has altered in large scale. Fighting in prosperous times against the big companies years for fully paid health care, child care, pensions, vacation time, education benefits and so on, they are forced nowadays to give wage concessions in order to remain at least a fraction of the jobs in Detroit and not to automate or outsource parts of production to low-wage countries. A proper way to solve problems would be a meeting between the UAW and the Big Three, for working out a plan for the future. However, the companies still are far too self-centred for taking any steps of that kind⁵¹.

Of course, as the auto giants experience a strong crisis, they want to enhance the reliability, quality and design of the cars. In the first case, call-backs of many newly introduced cars, as the very recently updated Ford Firebird, destroyed immediately the hope for a better image. As in the latter case, the Ford Taurus for example, a usually very high-volume selling car, was designed too roundish for the taste of American customers. Normally an avoidable fault, if the company had made more researches, about what car purchasers want. This is generally a problem of the Big Three that the imports always had taken advantage of, as they did not make the mistake of leaving customers' needs unheard.

Shortly after the terrorist attacks in September 2001, many Americans joined the patriotic feeling by buying cars of the Big Three. The car companies also offered zero percent financing on cars, actively approaching the customers. This resulted in a considerable deficit for the companies but they gained back some percentage of the market share. However, as customers detected a lesser degree of reliability, durability, styling and value in general, compared to imports, they were of course disappointed. Unfortunately the big American car companies were not showing any understanding and ignored the sign of the inconsolable customers⁵², falling back to their old role as being arrogant and starry-eyed.

As another disadvantage for the American car industry proofed the utilisation of Internet. Interested purchasers of automobiles make extensive researches on the World Wide Web, receiving loads of information about used car resale value, leasing and invoice prices. The user is able to compare different kinds of cars from different companies in no time. Although the purchases of cars directly over the Internet are very rare, lacking the personal contact to the dealer, already 60% of car buyers benefit from the wealth of data they found on the Internet. Denny Clements, general manager of Lexus, sums the increased transparency for the purchasers up by saying “the better informed a customer is, the worse it is for Detroit”.⁵³

In long term, the outlook for the Detroit car companies is quite bleak, as no true solution in sight. As the City of Detroit is closely connected to the future of its car industry, the metropolis might get into severe financial and social trouble, as less and less workers have a job, slipping into long-term unemployment, unable to paying any taxes. Finally, Detroit could not close the gap from manufacturing industry to service providing industry. Furthermore, the remaining car companies like Chrysler, GM and Ford follow subsequently market trends like globalisation, technological changes like automation and the decreased demand for less-skilled work.⁵⁴

For the American car industry in general, the outlook is so not cloudy at all: several car import corporations now let produce their cars in other American regions. Above all, Birmingham, located in Alabama, rivals as a production location for car factories, giving the region already the nickname “South Detroit”. But also Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, and South Caroline are already today containing plants of car companies from abroad, all offering attractive conditions like little to no unionisation at all and financial incentives as the abatement of tax. Detroit as a city can not offer such stimulation, even if they want to, as they were pushed into a financial crisis since the Big Three are having losses as well and dismiss more and more tax paying workers into unemployment.

To close this first of three major chapters with the words of Micheline Maynard's book “The end of Detroit”:

“The emergence of [a] parallel American automobile industry is an astounding prospect, considering how deep Detroit's roots are sunk into the American culture. But the Detroit companies have had plenty of time to get used to the idea – since the 1980s, in fact”. ⁵⁵

2.2. Social changes in Detroit

The next major chapter in this essay will be devoted to the social change in Detroit. This is a very complex topic and will determine the future of the city and of the people living in Detroit equally as the economic development did. Nowadays, the two most important issues to solve are the discrimination of blacks and the disparity of the rich whites of the suburbs and poor African Americans in the City of Detroit.

<Sugrue: problems emerged certainly before 1970>

2.2.1. Overview of racial problems: development and perspective

I will begin the former point and examine the past racial relationship between blacks and whites, but also point out the present situation.

2.2.1.1. Early blacks arriving from the South

Already in post-civil war times around 1840s, blacks migrated northwards, as slavery was abolished in the South. By 1870, the black population was 2235, only about 3% of the city's population. It just grew moderately for the next 40 years⁵⁶. Since the manufacturing industry was developing very fast in the 1910s in Detroit, the city attracted many people from all over the world. However, strict immigration laws after World War I forced the car companies to recruit workers from the home country. One ethnic group dominated the move to Detroit, when relatively high-wage and low-skill work was available in the booming auto industry: African Americans. As Pic:19,30(1940s?) shows, about 70% of the 24000 blacks living in Detroit were born in the South of America. Still in the 1950s, just one generation later, about 60% were from the South, but the number of blacks was over 14 times (in total number: 352000) as high as it was in 1920. African Americans had virtually a chance to be assimilate into the American society, if they would have been allowed to. Unfortunately, things do often not develop properly in times of economical booms. Harsh contrasts between newly arriving and therefore jobless poor blacks, living in slums, and rich whites working as machinists or accountants emerged.

2.2.1.2. 1930s to 1970s: increasing tensions between races

Since discrimination, segregation was actually not forbidden, the situation aggravated, even for blacks working in well-paid blue-collar jobs. The whites predominately believed that their own race is superior and the blacks are just inferior. They refused consequentially mixed neighbourhoods, where both races live together. This barrier led to the fact that African Americans had to live in the most deteriorated sections of the town. When blacks were finally arriving after their journey from the South to those segregated neighbourhoods, if they were able to, they caused white exodus or at least neighbourhood instability. On the other side, enclaves with people of European ethnics dispersed and assimilated, buying newer and better housing.

Extreme organisations consisting of white members like the Ku Klux Klan gained popularity as they took advantage of the hatreds against African Americans. Even worse was the fact that the car manufacturers used the same animosities and prejudices for vulgar actions, like playing off unions in the 1920s: Ford for example reserved a special percentage for the most badly paid jobs for the poorest blacks in the factories, just to abuse the unemployed blacks as a kind of strike breakers, because they always were willing to work at any circumstances.⁵⁷

Unions played a crucial role, as they created to a great extent America's middle class. In the 1930s, the United Auto Workers (UAW) emphasised the principle of equal pay and opportunity for both blacks and whites, as they were afraid of permanent abuse of poor blacks as strike breakers, endangering the job of whites who stopped working in order to protest for more influence in the factories. No wonder that unions were very influential until the 1970s, because they united to some extent highly paid unskilled and skilled workers of all races.⁵⁸ However, problems were far from being solved, as we will see later in chapters 2.2.2. or 2.3.1.

When the World War II started, black and white workers were still used to separated labour markets; African Americans were restricted to foundry work and general labour. This was nothing new, as it was evident already in the mid-nineteenth century that those few blacks who moved to Detroit from the South were treated very differently from European immigrants. In the decade after World War I, whites instead felt save, as long as blacks were employed in the dirty, “nigger jobs”. But as soon as blacks got the opportunity, to get into “white jobs” during the World War II⁵⁹, the tensions increased dramatically, resulting in a race riot in 1943. During this incident, 34 people – all black – died, as a white crowd consisting of 100000 people raged in black quarters. This act of public lynching happened, because whites could not get along with the imagination that they might live together with middle-class blacks in the same quarter. African American's could now reach some prosperity as they were employed in a growing car industry that staff more and more jobs of higher positions that once were controlled only by whites. In the same period, whites protested in spontaneous strikes against “niggers” that are now employed next to whites ⁶⁰. In either way, they had to cope with the new situation as the car companies themselves had no other choice but to employ blacks in certain workplaces.

In the time between 1940 and 1970, about 600000 African Americans moved to Detroit (see PIC19,30). Most of them were drawn to the overcrowded and ramshackle Lower East Side quarter, where in 1960 90% of the buildings were not connected to the canalisation, reflecting the very poor living conditions. This district of Detroit was a kind of gateway for all newcomers to the city, hoping for better living standards when they would get a job. Unfortunately, an upward social mobility was denied for most of the blacks, as whites opposed desegregated living⁶¹.

This was the initial situation, as another riot started in 1967. It was in fact a social-economic rebellion of blacks without hope, triggered by a raid of a “blind-pig”⁶². A crowd of 192 police officers wanted to arrest 82 people, but instantly, rioters were overwhelming the cops. Reinforcement troops were few, because a lot of officers were on vacation. The governor activated the National Guard to help Detroit's police and state police, but the guards was poorly trained and often overreacted, leading to needless deaths and injuries, as 43 people⁶³ died during the incident. Finally, President L.B. Johnson ordered the US Army paratroopers from the 82^nd and 101^st Airborne division to Detroit that had a specialised training in urban disturbances; after all they brought order back to Detroit. 4400 policemen from Detroit, 8000 national guardsmen, 4700 federal troops and 360 state police officers were patrolling in Detroit a day after the riot. A deep polarisation between the races grew out of the riot as whites had a persistent view of the “bad blacks”, and the African Americans had justified hatreds against the ruthless police of Detroit that was consisting just out of whites. They had no chance to call attention to their problems.

Detroit got one of the cities of the USA with the worst problems. There was no compulsory connection between the automotive boom and a peacefully coexistence between the races. Whites consequently fled out of the core of the city (see 2.3.1.2.), decreasing the total population, in times where the population of blacks increased. The political and social self-consciousness of blacks raised, but they were also recognising their isolated position and the increasing wealth of the white middle-class. Riots had been foreseen by many in Detroit, however until the late 1960s, African Americans were not represented in the city government nor in the police.

Another decisive point in the history of racial conflict in Detroit was the school desegregation policy introduced in 1970. Schools, like houses represent a racial territory and status. They are often the central institutions in the communities. One reason why whites opposed blacks' moving into their quarter was the point that they knew residential integration would finally lead to school integration. As a committee acknowledged the presence of severe racism in the Detroit school system, it recommended busing⁶⁴ as a solution in order to end segregation. This revealed racist feelings of many suburban whites towards blacks in the City of Detroit, similar to the hysteria after the riot in 1967 that had driven many whites out of Detroit. In the suburban community Pontiac, ten empty school busses were bombed, in order to prevent the transportation to racially integrated classrooms. Nowadays, while some white suburbanites accepted the busing of black students to suburban schools, they strongly oppose the imagination that their children are bussed into the predominately black City of Detroit. Many whites try to avoid all contact with blacks, particularly the whites who have moved to the fringes of the city to get away from the blacks in Detroit.

A few years later, in 1974, a strong mayor and a champion of the fast growing black community took over city government: Coleman Young, the nation's first black mayor in a large city. He was very charismatic and committed to his job, promising to defy racial wrongs and to redevelop the city effectively (see 2.3.3.3). But even for him, the coincident consequences of industrial and commercial decline, population loss, increasing poverty and racial conflict proved hardly solvable. He also just got elected, as whites were fleeing out of the city, leaving the votes to the blacks. His trials to develop a better city brought some little success, but failed to heal the deep wounds that racial hatred had caused. He sometimes even polarised the citizens further, when, for example, he said every black should legally own a gun for self-defence. Coleman was mayor until 1993, when Dennis Archer took office.

2.2.1.3. The contemporary situation compared to other big US cities

Pic19,176

19,6:Today, metropolitan Detroit is distinguished from other Northern and midwestern metropolis of its relatively large African American population: 22% in 1990, about twice the national average. However, the City of Detroit consists of about 90% blacks nowadays, an unbelievable number compared to the US average.

While some racial problems relaxed in Detroit and in the whole United States of America, tremendous issues remain. The gathering of poor blacks in inner-city slums with daily problems like drugs⁶⁵, violence, robbery, murder and crime in general sustain the trend that blacks and whites separate from each other. Another fact is shocking: in the year of the 1967 rebellion, a total number of 281 people got murdered in Detroit. In 1998, about 500 people were killed (pic19,46), although the city lost many of its (mostly white) inhabitants during that time. This is the evidence for the fact that a poor group kills members of its very own group, if it is stuck in racial isolation; crimes are committed in general from blacks against blacks. Actually, whites have no reason therefore to be frightened, because the violence is exercised in a limited but random and thoughtless milieu of excluded and neglected. With about 50 homicides per 100000 residents, Detroit leads one of the nation's worst record.

Stereotypes emerged in both ethnic groups; the corresponding neighbourhood segregation does not distinguish Detroit from other big US cities like Atlanta, Chicago, Boston or New York. In his book “Detroit divided”, Farley Reynolds putted it in these words⁶⁶:

“In all the nation's older metropolitan areas with substantial African American populations, black and white seldom live in the same neighbourhoods. But the thoroughness with which long-term social, economic and racial trends produced an African American central city in Detroit surrounded by an overwhelmingly white suburban ring makes Detroit unique.”

[Detroit's long-term fate and many details of its past are shared by a lot of urban centres across the United States. Like Detroit, for example, many northern industrial urban centres in the post war era evolved from prosperous magnets for native- and foreign born citizens to decayed centres where prosperity seemed impossible. Detroit's economic downfall was obviously more dramatic than that which other inner cities experience. Detroit also was not the only dependent on, and dragged by, the big industries as the 1980s were beginning. In Pittsburgh, Cleveland and the South side of Los Angeles, inner-city residents fight to survive economically where once prosperity had been forecasted. Likewise, just as Detroit experienced a dramatic exodus of whites during the 1970s, and thus housed an African American majority thereafter, so did many central cities in the United Sates. However, Detroit's demographic metamorphosis was more extreme than in most other cities, but the white flight that it experienced was not unique. Though, in 1997, metropolitan Detroit was the most segregated city of all 47 major US metro regions with at least on million residents.

Of course, there were several enactments from the government, to face segregation or discrimination, but all suffer from one flaw: they are passed in Washington, but local whites oppose them in most cases. Controversial methods like the affirmative actions are no solution to the racial segregation, in this case, segregation at work, because the do not establish a voluntary base for racial co-operation. Favoured by most blacks, whites oppose affirmative action, as PIC19,242 shows.

As long as it is a matter of course that racial and class isolationism are accepted, racial and income segregation will exist, as the next chapter will prove.

2.2.2. Growing distance between rich and poor

As we have already seen in the previous overview of the racial problems, there is always the returning issue of racial problems combined with a difference of wealth the group can gain.

2.2.2.1. How the classes overlap with races

Obviously, the races overlap with their status in the society, their class; black are predominately poor and living in poor dwellings located in the City of Detroit, whereas whites are predominately living in the suburban ring and enjoy wealth and good housing. PIC19,50 shows exactly that distribution in the period between 1950 and 1990. Another fact is striking when analysing the charts: the income situation changed hardly for the blacks/City of Detroit, whereas the whites/suburban quarters experienced an upswing in monetary affairs. In the case of the City of Detroit, the lowest class even augmented, reducing the taxes and therefore the financial power of the city, to counter such a development, as we will see later. Of course, blacks who are well off were trying also to flee to the outlying sections of the city, just like their white counterparts. However, this only contributed even more to the residential segregation of the black poor. More surprisingly is the fact that white and black homeowners joined their forces to oppose publicly funded housing for the poor, as they were afraid of sinking property values⁶⁷.

2.2.2.2. Social gap due to racial discrimination and segregation

A survey initiated by the daily “Detroit Free Press” in 1970 revealed the following Top Five complaints among black residents in the city: 1) Police brutality, 2) Poor housing, 3) Poverty, 4) Lack of jobs, 5) Overcrowded living conditions. All points listed refer basically to racial discrimination and the according segregation. Disparities between the races existed (and still remain today) at several levels, namely at workplaces, education, income, housing and so on.

The first topic, inequality at work exists until today, although it was officially abolished shortly after the World War II (see 2.2.1.2, footnote 57). In the late 1990s, about 64% of the black male working force in Detroit between the ages of 25 and 64 have had job. Among white men, 87% were employed. That trend has lingered for decades, even in the booming economy of the 1950s, as 84% of black men respectively 92% of white men were employed. Since 1970, when many blue-collar jobs began to disappear, no more than 65% of black men have had an occupation at any point in history.⁶⁸ Blacks in Detroit therefore have generally have had an unemployment rate to 3 times of whites at all time, sometimes backing up the prejudice of lazy African Americans from whites. Naturally, a high potential of conflicts is emerging, as there are serious differences of income between the ethnic groups. Since the job situation in the City of Detroit worsened, no solution is in sight.

The second point, differences in the education(pic19,100) of inner-city black students and white youths living on the rim of the city, did not change just because of the cross-district school-busing. Inner city schools and universities in the city are severely underfunded, resulting in poorly paid teachers and little equipment at class to enrich the lessons. Consequently, African Americans have less job opportunities and/or are paid worse than their white counterparts. This again ends in income disparity; there also seems a strong tendency of white employers, to hire persons of their own skin colour. Farley Reynolds conducted a survey shown in (PIC,19,???); as he analysed the results in the book “Detroit Divided”, he arrives at the conclusion that:

“...African Americans believe that they frequently miss out on good jobs, promotions and attractive homes and neighbourhoods because of systematic and pervasive racial discrimination. Regardless of their educational attainment, income or occupational achievements, Detroit's African Americans see extensive racial discrimination in all areas of public life. From their viewpoint, it is a colour-coded metropolis with whites in control. (...) Racial views have changed, but when whites are getting asked about the modern racial stereotypes – that is, about racial differences in the tendency to be intelligent or the tendency to prefer to live off welfare rather than to work for a living – they still often followed negative stereotypes.”⁶⁹

The final point to be examined is the perpetual housing issue, which is a perfect example of the synergy of racial discrimination and resulting segregation. There were various forms of racial discrimination by real estate brokers, financial organisations and government institutions that prevented black residence in the suburbs. Ever since African Americans were coming to Detroit in large numbers in the times around the World Wars, residential isolation was enormous. As blacks moved up the ladder in monetary affairs when they received their salaries for their work in the factories, they sought better housing. But the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance program, for example, subsidising the growth of the Detroit suburbs, primarily gave benefits to white middle- and working-class residents. The reason is that the FHA adopted a segregationist policy and refused to insure construction projects that did not match their edicts. The common belief of white appraisers⁷⁰ employed by the government office, was that racial integration of suburbs would lower property values. Although there was no evidence for this assumption, it was an official policy in the FHA; race was officially listed as a valid reason for rejecting a mortgage. The HOLC (Home Owners Loan Corporation) also encouraged racial apartheid; for a long time, both institutions refused to make loans to areas where many blacks lived, although some of the areas were in a perfect state. It was not until the early 1960s when the federal government in form of President J.F. Kennedy, finally took steps to ensure that housing was “open” to all races⁷¹. Unfortunately the ordinance came far too late and left another fact unchanged: the actions of real estate brokers. They were still actively gaining money by exploiting the fears of many whites homeowners in racially mixed areas. The realty agents pretended that if even more blacks will come to the quarter, the value of the property increases further. Many whites were selling their houses in panic, enabling opulent bargains for the real estate companies. To make things worse, the state Michigan, containing Detroit, did not as many other states prohibit discrimination in key domains like public housing, real estate actions and money lending businesses.

As a result of all the matters stated before, blacks could not leave the central city at the same rate as whites, because of unnatural burdens. Due to this, instability and contemporary racial segregation still survived until today. To envision the long-term legacy of racial segregation: in the late 1950s, 178000 new homes were constructed at the outer limits of the city, but only 750 were available to non-whites⁷²; as former generations of African Americans could not move out of the city in the same extent as the whites, they were caught in a ghetto. The following generations sometimes never had the chance to exit the inner districts of the city, because they suffered from unemployment or lack of financial means. If the black population size had been stable or shrinking, discrimination in the larger housing market would perhaps been bearable. But since the number of African Americans living in the city continued to grow, the situation worsened. A vicious circle emerged.

Pic19,160 19,190real estate

2.2.2.3. A divided Detroit

To recapitulate the basic situation in Detroit: the city is consisting of two major parts: firstly the affluent suburbs, where a majority of well-off whites live and secondly, the black people living in the City of Detroit, suffering both from pauperism and isolation. Thus, race inequality is as widespread in metropolitan Detroit as class inequality.

As industrial growth extended to the suburbs and as commercial capital concentrated on the periphery of urban areas, the line of uneven development shifted from cities within the city to to a line that divided the city from its suburbs. In the case of Detroit, this is a racial blockade.

The distribution is portrayed in pic19,174 and clearly mark a divided Detroit. The white population of the city fell dramatically from 1546000 in 1950 to 222000 in 1990 – a drop of 85%. It was an inherent move to the suburbs, a reaction of the better economic situation they experienced. For the blacks of Detroit, this residential mobility was denied for several reasons discussed earlier. Even if some middle-class blacks were able and brave enough to settle down in suburbs bordering the city of Detroit, whites fled(pic19,160), again creating new segregated enclaves. A climbing percentage of blacks in the inner-city is a century-long trend, as pic19,176 shows. As no shift of population is in sight, by 2020, about 95% will be African Americans.

Corresponding to this evolution was the decline of jobs in the city and the opposed boost of jobs in the suburban ring (see pic 19,64). Technological change in industry and the pressures of international competition created better job opportunities for high skilled workers, but fewer and lower paid ones for unskilled workers. Whites had traditionally enjoyed a better education than blacks, but when also blue-collar jobs were shifting from the city to the suburbs, unskilled blacks remained in the city and a large part of them got unemployed during this reorganisation. As long as life opportunities and living conditions vary so greatly by race, prosperity is not possible within the metropolitan area. Racial isolation worsens poor social and economic conditions, which leads to desperation and its manifestations (drugs, crime), which results in an even more isolation. Even today, the estimated percentage of people living under the official poverty line in Detroit is about 40% and the potential to commit crimes rises at least two times⁷³. (pic 10,270)

PICS19,180 19,68

2.3. City planning in Detroit

The last major point in this work will be the contemplation of city planning issues, redevelopment problems and the steps that were taken to counter all levels of problems within the City of Detroit. This resort of administration is in my opinion by far the most important to shape Detroit's future.

Detroit and its suburbs combine to form a metropolis where 3.91 million people live. The Detroit city of 0.919⁷⁴ million comprises 23.3% of the population and 85% of the region's blacks. In contrast, the suburbs are where 76.7%, or 3 million people live; 88% are whites and 4.2% are blacks.

17,623

2.3.1. Detroit’s phenomenon of the escape to suburban areas

[4,16:The growth in ownership of automobiles was accompanied by a growth in migration of population from rural to urban centres. The trend toward home ownership first led to urban sprawl, then to suburban migration and the need for multiple auto ownership. Such ownership also increased the average number of cars per household from 0.8 in 1950 to 1.2 in 1970. Even more people were moving to the fringes of the city, as the (mostly white) families got mobile.]

[11,7:Two main reasons for that growth of suburban districts were a in the first place a housing boom, financed with federal home mortgage insurance programs and tax policies and in the second place a heavy reliance on automobiles, financed by federal support of highways. Another reason was the attractive amenities of suburban life. But racial change within cities speeded white exodus to the suburbs. Suburban housing and quality of life were the primary “pull” attracting urban Whites, but Black entry into formerly White residential areas was a major “push” encouraging many to leave.}

2.3.1.1. Relocation of the industry and business to the fringes of the city

PICcityboundaries,19,27; The manufacturing industry moved out of the City of Detroit because of many reasons: taxes were lower, building areas were larger and cheaper, assembling firms were nearby, planned new headquarters could be established and there were less restrictions on how to construct new plants. Before the great boom in the car industry, the production was concentrated in huge plants within the City of Detroit. But since the demand for production rose in World War II, new factory buildings had to be erected in the suburbs. The foremost factory was the one who produced bombers in Ypsilanti – Willow Run, just 30 miles West of Detroit. But also the Big Three altogether built 20 new auto plants during the decade following World War II, all erected outside the official central city boundaries.⁷⁵ So, Ford for example, moved its headquarters to the suburb Dearborn, escaping the high taxes of Detroit.⁷⁶ But also other central offices of other automobile companies did not stick to Detroit, as all were relocated until 1920.⁷⁷ This development occurred all before World War II, but far reaching consequences resulted. The suburbs grew rich as they received plenty of taxes but had little expenditures like health care. Furthermore, as the 1960s had arrived, the older plants located in Detroit became outdated and had to be closed. As we already discussed in 2.2.1.3., automobile companies and supplier firms had to transfer jobs to suburbs, other parts of the USA or to foreign countries. As wage rates were still high in Detroit, some of the older facilities got automated, resulting in less employment for the less educated. Between the late 1940s and the early 1980s, Detroit's share of the region's manufacturing employment dropped from 60,3% to 25%. But also the retail trade declined from 72,6% to 15,4%.⁷⁸ Big shopping centres and malls drew away the sales of Detroit's flagship in the retail sector: J.L. Hudson Company. The firm was the nation's second retail leader after Macy's in the era right after World War II and is perfect case to illustrate the commercial disinvestment of the city. In the 1940s, the 25-storied building with about 2 million square-foot of space, the company had the most prosperous times, when it generated 3 times the dealings as its closest competitor. But as people, corporations and capital was moving out of the city, the sales figures declined dramatically, resulting in the abandonment of the Hudson building in 1983, and its blasting in 1998(pic 17,614). With its shutdown, the city with then 1.2 million inhabitants did not house anymore any greater retail shop.

In sum, Detroit lost 187000 jobs between 1958 and 1982, mostly in manufacturing and retail trade. But Firms were leaving just for practical reasons. The city had high taxes, strict building requirements and the suburbs were attractive because of the cheap sites. Detroit however, with high taxes, dated production facilities, a public infrastructure in poor condition and strongly unionised labour force, could not retain business activity or even attract new one.⁷⁹

Pic root,47

2.3.1.2. Counterproductive infrastructural enhancement

As jobs relocated to the outer limits of Detroit, workers had to get to the outlying production facilities. Still in the World War II, the construction of an “Industrial Expressway” was planned in 1942, to grant the supply of people and material for the factory in Ypsilanti - Willow Run. Of course, these highway constructions provided an easy access to the factories outside the city and were also a “perfect” road-transportation system to get in and out of the city. White dwellers therefore moved out of the City of Detroit, because the suburbs were connected properly with the city, which still held the retail power and some manufacturing jobs. This development was further stimulated with for example the construction of the Davison Expressway or of the Interstate 75 through Highland Park in the 1950s and 1960s. The demand for surfaced roads increased since then and, in turn, stimulated the use of the automobile and made the movement of population from the inner cities to suburbs and from rural areas to metropolitan centres easier. At the same time that the city worked to attract people to the central districts of Detroit by expressways, it helped them to leave the city (PIC061701hiwaysmotowneps.jpg). As road systems grew and improved, more people bought more cars and public transit systems got worse. The federal government and its 1956 federal highway legislation made it financially easy to construct those infrastructure; but the foundation of express- and highways was counterproductive, as it helped shoppers and workers became even less tied to the City of Detroit. Many city administrators believed that building highways and parking lots would resolve traffic jams and make downtown competitive with suburban malls. However, the parking space was not free of space and could never mess with the free parking that suburban malls provided. A terrible fault during that time was the fact that the city administration often preferred poor quarters for their construction sites of the infrastructure, because they were easy to get for their “renewal” program, which resulted in fact slum elimination or the destruction of healthy black neighbourhoods. Although, housing segregation was virtually abolished, it was practised practically by every real estate dealers, and therefore, the displaced blacks got concentrated in even poorer ghetto areas. (see 2.3.2.2.). Furthermore, the highways sliced the once coherent city and isolated parcels remained.

2.3.1.3. Motivation for the exodus of residents

Detroit's population peaked in the mid-1950s at just over 1.8 million people and has declined ever since, whereas for example the suburban county Macomb grew about 119 percent during the 1950s.⁸⁰ As I already mentioned, there were “push” factors for whites to leave the city and “pull” factors⁸¹ that made the suburbs very attractive. Let us begin with the push factors like the extensive freeway system discussed in 2.3.1.2.; the job loss in the city that had started in the 1950s, made the decision easy, to move out, if one could afford it. Also the racial issues, broadly discussed in 2.2., were intensifying as the African American population grew steadily (PIC) in Detroit and whites, fearing similar riots to the one in 1967, were moving out of the city. Whites were also afraid of crime, the growing level of poverty and the abandonment of buildings they produced themselves. Aside from that, many whites highly opposed the busing plan, because they wanted their children to go to schools that are meters, not miles away.

Now, we turn to the “pull” factors of the suburbs: firstly, the housing issue. As Detroit was growing in the post-war era, homes on the fringes of the city were quite expensive, as for a $24000 brick house, mortgage dealers required a 30% down payment⁸². But as President Eisenhower was in office, he wanted an expanding housing industry and thereforee made new deals that only required 3.3% down payment of war-veterans for a new house in the suburbs. The Federal Housing Authority (FHA) supported this also by giving away loans to very good conditions. The segregational practices of the department, not to allow loans in neighbourhoods, where many blacks lived, prevented also many liberal whites from building a home in the city, as we saw 2.2.2.2. Additionally, taxes were also lower for families, not just for industry and retail. Many other dwellers living in the core of Detroit were also attracted by a life in the suburbs that pretends to be the true “American Dream”: what is needed, when you can yourself afford an own car, is a garage with a small but nice house and a green garden. More personal space is available and one does not have to endure the tensions within the city. Also, a friendly community with self organisation, personal security and mutual care were depicted. Huge malls, where endless hours can be spent on shopping and strolling, opened in the 1950s. Last but not least, the residents in the suburbs wanted to be envied by their life they led. They paid the obligation to conformance as a price for the advantages. While any particular family could have had their own motivation to move over to the suburbs, the cumulative effect managed to depopulate the city of Detroit selectively, as the flight was classified by racial animosities and income or class differences. Characteristic is the following statement⁸³ in “Detroit – Race and Uneven Development”, mentioning that

“(...) the arrival of Negroes served as an excuse to invest in that stainless steel, formic and plywood-panelled dream house and believe at the same time that they were acting wisely from an economic point of view. The pull of the suburbs and the quest for social status was too much for many whites, even those who believe strongly in integration. And as middle-class white neighbourhoods in Detroit opened up to blacks in the 1950s and 1960s, some after a serious of conflicts and others via cooperation or at least practical coexistence, they tended to become extensions of the black ghettos rather than long-term biracial communities”.

Not mattering how middle-class blacks were welcomed in the new neighbourhoods, the increased number of blacks also getting out of the city, left the poor residents over.

2.3.2. Consequences of urban flight

Since the beginning of the 50s, the white suburbs took over the economical power and declared the white areas that surround the black inner city to the “Metropolitan Area of Detroit”, in order to distinguish from the “City of Detroit” which is – in their opinion – full of crime and dirt.

2.3.2.1. Loss of capital

With the remnant dwellers in the city working in low-wage jobs, unemployed and poor, the city fell short of money. The tax base⁸⁴ was not big enough, to shoulder the care programs, as health care. As the well-off left the city, so did the retail power. The population shift resulted in massive movement of capital to suburban areas as we see in PIC6,20pop/weatlhshift. It is shown, how the central city did own half of the region's property wealth in 1960 and ranked first by far. By 1980, Detroit's share of the region's property value had shrunk to a devastating 16.5%, whereas Macomb and Oakland county were unrivalled. Also alarming: due to the economic tailspin of the central city, the assessed valuation had fallen in real terms between two decades: in 1960, 42.3% of the population had 49.6% of wealth (ratio 1,17), but in 1980, 17.6% of the population possessed just 16,5% (ratio 0,94)⁸⁵. At least as severe as this was the decline of industrial investment of about 50% in just two decades: in 1958, 44% of investment projects were targeted to Detroit, in 1977 barely 22%⁸⁶.

“Capital was mobile, but Detroit was not”⁸⁷ is the statement of Thomas June in her book “Redevelopment and race” that hits the nail on the head. While the automobile industry could escape somehow by decentralising, modernising and seeking new markets, the City of Detroit could not. Its manufacturing sectors was in a serious state of decline, yet some industrials firms moved out of the inner city, further reducing the tax base.

But not only the source of capital through taxes were drawn to an end, federal funds also diminished. In 1980, federal money of $392 million made up over 26% of the budget of the city.⁸⁸ During the 1980s, the federal government discontinued its general revenue sharing⁸⁹ program and limited money for job training, Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)⁹⁰, housing subsidies, mass transportation, health and other sectors.

While city populations fell 35% in the 30 years between 1950 and 1980, the total number of employed residents dropped 48%⁹¹. Such unbalanced loss of employed residents combined with a decline in city revenue because of stagnant property values and residential flight added up to serious fiscal problems for the city.

This is the resulting dilemma: the taxes are more than insufficient but they also cannot be risen, as even more business would respond to the call of the suburbs.

2.3.2.2. Ghettos and slums: the isolated urban inner city

Black slums have existed since a long period of time, because blacks arrived in Detroit after their journey from the South, and ghettos had a gatekeeper role for them; city areas generally grew not on purpose until the 1950s in America.

But when the industrial decline set in, just about 100000 working places⁹² remained in the inner city. During the daylight hours, the people work in the skyscrapers for the public administration, insurances, law courts, law firms or in other branches of the service sectors. But when it gets dark, the workers are leaving the city and the urban inner city turns isolated without any pedestrians. Parking garages today are built out of bureau-office buildings or even prior theatres(PIC). About one third of the dwellings is vacant⁹³ and therefore often located in wasteland. But also hotels, office structures or other kind of buildings in the heart of the city, in the Central Business District (CBD)⁹⁴, are often unoccupied. Moreover, Detroit has to face many problems: poverty, racism, depopulation and economic decline.

With a life in unemployment, over 250000 people of the Blacks receive money from federal social aid programs, over 100000 households are just single-parent homes, whereas three quarters are African Americans⁹⁵.

Also, all-black neighbourhoods emerged. When whites did move out of neighbourhoods like Bagley or Mack-Concord (pic)? Poorer blacks were able to join or replace middle-class blacks. These areas changed by racial and income means, often leading to problems of housing maintenance or crime. In other words(11,101):

As the numbers of renters increased, the city reduced attempts to enforce the housing code. Lending institutions withheld mortgages or loans for home improvement and real estate agents steered young White families away. All of this led to a self-fulfilling prophecy: Black entry into neighbourhoods did lead to deterioration – a classic case of blaming the victim.

Public housing was once more an issue: Detroit stopped to spread public housing projects over the whole city, but concentrated it in the inner-city, laying the cornerstone for ghettos. Suburban communities refused to pay for the problems belonging to Detroit, and did not finance any public housing. Prevalent racial prejudices triumphed⁹⁶.

[There are generally two attitudes towards the phenomenon of badly developed areas: On the one hand those who are most concerned about slums, so about deteriorated housing. They also support public housing programs and tend to come from liberal backgrounds. On the other hand there are those concerned about blight, which is usually hinting to economic deterioration. These people were often land- or business-owners themselves and are more worried about falling property values than the future of the poor.]

2.3.3. Attempts to improve the situation in Detroit

Normally, American cities were founded for a commercial purpose, they got developed on drawing boards of real estate dealers⁹⁷, not on the ones by city planners; this makes it very hard, to influence the shape of any city by any specific city planning measures or redevelopment policies. The matter of redesigning the city may be the most sophisticated, complicated and difficult to manage, because every subject – not mattering whether of social, racial, economical, financial, aesthetic-architectural,... point of view – has to be taken into account.

2.3.3.1. Early trials in the from the 1950s to 1970s

pic: selected redevelopment projects in D. 1948-1984|Pic 11,32

Already in the years following the World War II, a so called master plan⁹⁸ was developed for the first time in 1951, in order to shape Detroit in a decent way. Every planner had to stick to the plan and the city officials were hoping for a homogenous townscape by developing broad stripes of industrial and commercial corridors and organising residential areas around neighbourhood units. The city wanted to buy existing houses, prepare the properties and resell them cheaply to industrial firms. But the project fell short of the city's expectations, as just 167 acres instead of the 2540 needed acres could be provided at large expenses in the 1960s. Ironically, this restructuring of the city did assume that you have to destroy parts of the city for keeping its the industry. So the plan was not sufficient enough to counter all the problems; it could not eliminate blight, at most guide the growth of the city in certain areas. However, it was a first trial and still exists today in a revised form (URL).

Also, to avoid the severe congestion on the roads during the rush-hours, the city decided to build several highways with the mentioned aftermath described in 2.3.1.2. Many black neighbourhoods were intentionally destroyed and these restructuring was perceived as an act of “slum clearance” and not as a an act of revitalisation. This is also the cause for many, to be scared and devaluate the actions which were undertaken by the city, as it was often opposed to blacks and enforced by whites. But not only did redevelopment negatively affect racial justice, it was also the other way round, race relations negatively affected redevelopment. In particular, this was the case when racial polarisation continued within the Metropolitan Area of Detroit and white developers, real estate agents and homeowners preferred to reshape the white suburbs over the dark inner-city.

[6,175: After the late 1960s, the city switched away from the slum-clearance characteristic of urban renewal. It rather focussed residential rehabilitation and economic development policies designed to keep institutions and industries from leaving the central city. Money was spent and tax concessions were made in order to keep industrial corporations in Detroit, because work places stand for new residents. But it was a zero-sum game because the disadvantages as resettlement and high expenditures compensated the advantages like few decent houses and work places.]

But even when residential areas were about to be redeveloped, many dwellers of the settled site had to be removed temporary, and it is quite unsure that the inhabitants of former houses could ever possibly afford new ones in the afterwards restructured area. Sometimes, the sectors did not even include residential units, but were supposed for industrial or commerce only.⁹⁹

However, there were some more or less successful model projects like the restructured Lafayette (formerly Gratiot) Park (PIC 21,) in the East. It was planned, among others, by the famous architect Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, This plan had also major flaws, because it destroyed more housing than it generated and could not stop the elopement of the middle-class. Detroit had to face many problems, like poverty, depopulation and economic decline. Survival became a real issue as housing and jobs deteriorated. A lot of people considered it to be sarcastic, when Detroit drains its money into some model projects¹⁰⁰ instead of helping the needy.

Worth mentioning, too, is the project of the Civic Center in downtown. Downtown by itself is about one quare mile large, and can be crossed in about half an hour per foot. The Civic Center finished construction in the late 1960s. Cobo Hall and the Convention Center(pic11/6/21/17), part of the complex, is still today a very important factor in Detroit's renown, as the famous Detroit Auto Show exhibits in Cobo Hall. Some additions like the Civic Center Riverfront Promenade (21,20) followed in later years later, keeping the site up to date. But the in some opinions, the buildings are too overloaded and too cubic, likely that you lose the way.

After all, actually little has changed in Detroit in general; although a number of new apartments and office buildings have been built, no greater retail shop opened its doors. Meanwhile, many low-income housings further decayed or were abandoned. This process, once more, prevented many commercial or industrial investors from building their branches in Detroit, and so, the tax base of the city further declined without any relaxation on the job market.

2.3.3.2. A ray of hope? The Central Business District

To attract new business for the city of Detroit, the authorities therefore refocussed from redevelopment of residential areas to the revitalisation of the Central Business District (CBD), part of the downtown. It consists nowadays of skyscrapers and office buildings, where for example public administration, law courts and business of the service sector are disposed. It is obvious that Detroit is trying to transform away from the Motor City to a financial, administrative and professional service centre for car and retail industry. As the magnetic effect of the Civic Center reduced, a private investor stepped in for a project that should revitalise the city: Henry Ford II, member of the wealthy Ford family, presented his vision to revitalise Detroit in form of the Renaissance Center (RenCen) to counter mass downtown exodus. Preparations were made during the period from 1971 to 1973 to construct the privately financed building. Ford personally stood up for the project and talked with other automobile industry corporations to convince them to invest in the construction of Renaissance Center, which was located nearby the Civic Center. Here is how things developed since then (from 11,144):

“The resulting 51-member partnership, called 'Detroit Renaissance', was then the largest private investment group ever assembled for an American urban real estate venture. Financing came from a $200 million construction loans from major insurance companies and investments from the corporate partners, including at least $300 million from Ford Motor Company. The resulting complex became an instant Detroit landmark, finished by 1977. Five high towers made up the original phase, with a hotel offering 1400 rooms occupying the innermost, 73-story cylinder. Four outer towers were 39 stories each and accommodated offices. But the RenCen experienced a number of problems; it was not properly connected to the surroundings, making it difficult for pedestrians to enter. It was quite clear from the beginning that the building offered an over-capacity, although GM and Ford transferred some offices from their headquarters to the Renaissance Center. The RenCen suffered major financial losses, forcing the original investors to sell it [to an other investment group]. But the building symbolised the potential of the riverfront and the central business district.“

And it still has a catalytic function today, even it was a financial disaster as it provided too much of space in times, where the economy depressed the real estate market, retail business and hotel reservations in Detroit. In 1996, GM repurchased the building, now operating as GM's headquarters with 6000 workers and additional 2000 tenants. The building provides 5.5 million square feet as office space and 150000 quare feet are reserved for retail business. Also, the Marriott Renaissance Center Hotel, with 1298 rooms uses the building. GM is now renovating the building for about $500 million since the year 2000.¹⁰¹

Other projects to enrich the downtown area were for example the Millender Center (11,151), which stands just across the RenCen and was completed in 1985 as a mixed-use project, also with a hotel, some retail shops and restaurants; Trappers Alley (21,40) provided a festival marketplace mall, Rolley Plaza served as a apartment building and a new District Court Building was constructed. ..

The riverfront, with its inherited beautiful scenery also was part of the urban renewal plan; Riverfront West, a twin-towered with 29 storied apartments, was built, also by two private investors.

Another model project was the People Mover, a mono-rail train, built in 1987. It connects many downtown like the Civic Center and the Renaissance Center by a 2.9-mile circular railway. But as a matter of fact, is not used by many people. As nearly every other construction, it has had also its flaws: it needed an extra $170 million over the calculated budget and the opening was ten years later than estimated.

In general, it is questionable that, when the development within the city is so uneven, so many dollars are being spent just to keep some businesses connected to the downtown.

In 1994, Dennis Archer became the new mayor after Coleman Young and he proofed as a man of diplomacy and capability. He stands for a new, more flexible and strategic way of city planning, as he set the focus more on self-initiatives. However, racial disunity remained an issue. He was more professional than his predecessor but at the same time, he was not a that racial polarising mayor. He approached actively white residents and the business sector. During his legislation the GM headquarters moved over into the Renaissance Center, three casinos and two stadiums were built. One of the sports arena is the Comerica Park, offering about 70000 quare feet of retail space and hosting some shops, restaurants, offices and other attractions. Nevertheless, Archer had to cope with legacy of a city that was ruled by “isolation, discrimination, prejudice, disparity and political division”.¹⁰²

In 2002, Kwame Kilpatrick - 31 years old - became the youngest elected mayor in Detroit's history. He initiated programs like the “Kids, Cops, Clean” project, including small but important steps towards a better future for the city; it consists for example of a better care about children, a more efficient and helpful police department and the effort, to clean the city. This program is mostly based on volunteers, as the financial background of the city is anything but healthy.

[employment_report2003.pdf, page 21 showing that CDB only district who gained jobs]

3. Past, present and future of Detroit; an attempt of a conclusion

After detailed examination of all prospects of society – economy, social relations and city planning – it is time to come to a conclusion and to assess the future of an ailing patient - Detroit.

[(x3.3.4 The future of the metropolitan Detroit)

Other pic: 19,27

2030_RDF_report.pdf,11

“SEMCOG Community Profiles.htm” forecast for 2030: 0.865 million inhabitants]

3.1. The problem of insufficient funds

To sum it up in one sentence: the reduced financial bases for local and regional government and the increasing social costs are very alarming. Industrial and residential exodus emptied the funds of the city as well as a change in federal policies. The Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) were a major resource for development funds. But as this financial source ran almost dry, because of other priorities came up, the city's budget is in the red.

Furthermore, as industry, commerce and well-off residents fled, the tax base is far too low to counter efficiently any further decline. Because of the decentralised tax system in the United States, the decline of population of Detroit had to lead to a financial disaster. The city is trapped once again: Detroit could try to tax its population even higher¹ to provide for example better health care services. But by doing so, the city was risking to loose even more of industry and middle-class residents. On the other hand, the city could keep the taxes at a constant level and accept decreasing quality of life and more race- and class-related conflicts. However, the stubborn and hardheaded suburbs are also to blame for this desolate monetary situation: they did not allow the City of Detroit to annex further areas², money for, for example, housing rehabilitation must be financed almost completely by the city itself. Inner city and suburbs have to co-operate in a more fundamental way, as many suburban residents profit from the city, like using the public libraries or infrastructure like canalisation or public transit system. For a intensified collaboration, SEMCOG (South East Michigan Council of Governments) was introduced, where governmental sections of the Metropolitan area of Detroit meet. However it has limited power and the its membership is voluntary.

Private, commercial investments in the CBD like the Renaissance Center could be the only answer to this devastating situation, the RenCen itself proofed out as a financial disaster. Neighbourhood redevelopment proofed very expensive but also was opposed by many displaced residents, predominately blacks.

3.2. Everlasting splits between races and classes

[2030_RDF_report.pdf,16]

Few urban areas have became that distressed like Detroit; it was doomed, when it lost its tax base and political support from the Presidents. As the city grew poorer, its social tensions exploded, setting in a vicious circle of greater white antipathy toward the inner city and, in turn, greater social malaise; there is in fact no real racism rather than a classism of unbelievable high scale. No way out is in sight, as socio-economic and structural-technical development emerged the non-working underclass that is predominantly black and living in the inner-city ghettos of the metropolis. Chances of being reunited with the rest of the society are very low, as resources(weird) provided in family, school, care, society or government are fading away. Moreover, Detroit actually got neglected for a long time by the whites, although well-knowing that the quantity and quality of problems rise even higher, when they abandoned the city. Many inner-city districts suffered of vacant houses whereas the city was demolishing them, further declining the property value.

<link>Racial disunity and conflict, even in the face of growing political power for the cities African Americans, brought a particular kind of devastation. The disparities in education, income, employment and life chances are simply to great between the poor and the rich. Disparity is deeply connected to discrimination since the caused isolation was also based in part on income.<link>

The area has been riven by racial conflict for so many decades that it seems unrealistic to believe that this will soon change.

<link>The easiest solution to get rid of the problems would be to create jobs, because tasks bring stability and a sense of meaning into life. Self-destructive patterns such as drugs and crime would burst. But since the future of the economy in the metropolitan areas of Detroit is not that bright, things will hardly change.

3.3. The omnipresence of economical decline

Actually, Detroit has not lost its glorious byname “Motor City of the USA”, since the car industry shifted from the manufacturing sector to service sector, and decentralised away from Detroit to suburbs, to other places in the USA or even to other countries; as manufacturing employment continues to decline, metropolitan Detroit stays a manufacturing center: 22% of Detroit's employment was working in durable goods manufacturing, whereas New York's rate was only 3%, Atlanta's 9% and Los Angeles' 10%³. Experts of economical affairs have discordant opinion, whether Detroit's economy is just in a temporary recession or it is an open-ended decline. Not mattering how the future of Detroit will look like, its contemporary economic condition is in a rather bad shape.....

Any steps undertaken by protectionists, to tax foreign goods, will not have the needed impact on the world economy that would be needed to push Detroit's economy; anyhow, a second car industry emerged in the USA, competing with the Big Three by producing nearly 5 million vehicle units per year and employing 85000 factory workers – more than Chrysler's and almost Ford's working staff. Furthermore, protectionistic measures will provoke retaliation by other countries and may even lead to unemployment in export orientated industries⁴.

Since a long time, pessimists announce the end of Detroit. They argue that the American car industry is no more healthy enough, to sustain two or more big players. Furthermore, they are afraid of the fact that the small earnings of GM, Ford and Chrysler will no more counterbalance their operational spending like costs for technical product innovation, health care and pensions for retired persons.

It would be in the interest of all levels involved in the employment – management, unions and governments – to regain back some of the manufacturing jobs in Detroit. However, since every group has its own, irrevocable views, it is next to impossible to find a common denominator and change the situation in a long-term view.

“To be sure, the end of Detroit's influence on the American automobile industry is a tremendous loss for Detroit. (...) In every corner of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb Counties are office parks and low-rise buildings that are home to suppliers, engineering firms, advertising companies and public relations agencies who owe their existence in some way to GM, Ford or Chrysler. But there is victory in all of this for American consumers. The import's success is being enjoyed by the people who have bought foreign cars and who love their vehicles. Yes, the demise of Detroit is a tragedy for Michigan and other states that depend on the Big Three companies. But investments by foreign companies are a boon to Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, Texas, California and other areas.”⁵

Because the City of Detroit has more unemployment and more poverty than the suburbs, it is unlikely that investors will move over to the city, as less wealthy people mean less income and less taxes for infrastructure and public services. Suburbs were enjoying federal transportation and housing policies, industrial and commercial rise and massive residential growth. An enormous gap between the city and the outskirts is even further widening.

As I pointed out at the beginning, there is no simple reasons why things developed like that; it is the complex history of race, society and employment structure that turned Detroit into the city it is right now.

Detroit could not relieve great part of its pain which was sometimes self-inflicted, somtimes caused by external circumstances.

In the year 1805, Detroit was on the verge of complete destruction - probably for the first time. As a bakery caught fire all buildings completely burned down, asides from one single stone house. Local Father Gabriel Richard noted⁶:

“Speramus meliora; resurget cineribus”

or

“We hope for better days; it shall rise from its ashes”

This phrase serves still today as the official motto of the city, imprinted on city arms. During the manifold history of Detroit, the city has never surrendered to the fight against the diseases like economical decline, racial issues and city planning missteps.

Detroit may be an ailing patient, but its heritage in historic, cultural and social hindsight keeps it far away from being dead or obsolete.

last modified on 27/01/04, 04:20:14

"All ^work and _{no play} makes Jack a dull boy."

Jack's phrase written eternally on endless pages in Kubrick's “The Shining”

4. Bibliography

Arranged alphabetically by the name of the author(s)

• Carlson, L.H., Highland Park oder die Zukunft der Stadt, Berlin, Aufbau Verlag, 1994

• [ Catanese, A.J., The politics of planning and development, Beverly Hills, SAGE Publications, 1984 ]

• Cohen, I., Echoes of Detroit: A 300-Year History, Haslett, City Vision Publishing, 2001

• Darden, J.T., Hill, R.C., Thomas, J., Thomas R., Detroit – Race and Uneven Development, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1987

• Duncan, O.D., Social change in a metropolitan community, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1974

• Farley, R., Danziger, S., Holzer H.J., Detroit divided, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 2002

• Gavrilovich, P., McGraw, B., The Detroit Almanac, Detroit, Detroit Free Press, 2001

• Georgakas, D., Surkin, M., Detroit: I do mind dying. – A study in urban revolution, London, Redwords, updated edition, 1998

• Hartigan, J., Racial situations: class predicaments of whiteness in Detroit, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999

• Henrickson, W.W., Detroit perspectives: crossroads and turning points, Detroit, Wayne State University Press,1991

• Hill, E.J., Gallagher, J., AIA Detroit – The American Institute of Architects Guide to Detroit Architecture, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 2003

• Kannan, N.P., Downsizing Detroit, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1982

• Sinclair, R., Thompson, B., Metropolitan Detroit: An Anatomy of Social Change, Cambridge(Massachusetts), Ballinger Publishing Company, 1977

• [ Mason, P.L., African Americans, labor and society organizing for a new agenda, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 2001 ]

• Mathewson, K., Financing the metropolis, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1980

• Maynard, M., The End of Detroit – how the Big Three lost their grip on the American car market, New York, Currency Book, 2003

• [ Meiklejohn, S.T., Wages, race and space: lessons from employers in Detroit’s auto industry, New York, Garland Publishing, 2000 ]

• Sugrue, T.J., The origins of the urban crisis: Race and inequality in postwar Detroit, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996

• Thomas, J., Redevelopment and race – Planning a Finer City in Postwar Detroit, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997

• Thompson, H.A., Whose Detroit? : politics, labor, and race in a modern American city, New York, Cornell University Press, 2001

• Vergara, Camilo J., The new American ghetto, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 2^nd paperback print edition, 1999

• Wolman, H.L., Agius, E.J., National urban policy: problems and prospects, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1996

5. Appendix

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